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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are whether Petitioner's support 
obligation is res judicata when her Divorce Decree specifies 
that her former husband must pay child support to her, but does 
not obligate her to pay support to him; whether an increased 
support order may be imposed retroactively on a divorced parent 
who has legal custody of a child but not physical custody; and 
whether changes in court-ordered support obligations may be 
made in administrative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court on Petitioner's Petition for Review from the 
Findings and Order of the Department of Social Services Admin-
istrative Court for the State of Utah. The Order, dated 
November 23, 1983, required the Petitioner/Appellant, Marsha 
Lee Starks Beachler, to reimburse^the Department of Social 
Services (the Department) for child support arrearages in the 
amount of $125.00, and further ordered her to pay $25.00 per 
month as ongoing child support to the Department as long as 
public assistance was provided for the minor child, Diana, to 
Petitioner's ex-husband, Mr. Hutchinson. (R. 36). The Third 
Judicial District Court, in a Memorandum Decision dated June 
19, 1986, affirmed the Findings and Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge. (R. 82). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Petitioner and John C. Hutchinson, had two children as 
issue to their marriage: Diana Michele Hutchinson and John 
_ i . 
Collins Hutchinson, Jr. The Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered a Decree of Divorce on 
June 15, 1972. The decree awarded custody of the minor chil-
dren to the Petitioner, and ordered Mr. Hutchinson to pay child 
support to the Petitioner in the amount of Sixty Dollars 
($60.00) per month per child. (R.34-35). The Decree does not 
obligate the Petitioner to pay any child support to Mr. 
Hutchinson. The decree was never judicially modified on the 
issues of child support or child custody. 
In or about October, 1982, the Petitioner and Mr. 
Hutchinson agreed that the minor child, Diana, would begin 
residing with Mr. Hutchinson. Approximately two months later, 
the Petitioner and Mr. Hutchinson agreed that John Jr. would 
also reside with Mr. Hutchinson. John Jr. lived with Mr. 
Hutchinson until May, 1983, when he returned to reside with 
Petitioner. (R.26, 27). 
Mr. Hutchinson applied for and received public assistance 
for the two children during June and July, 1983, and from 
August 1983, for an undetermined amount of time for the minor 
child, Diana. (R.22). Subsequently, the Office of Recovery 
Services assessed child support arrearages against the Peti-
tioner. After an administrative hearing before the Department 
of Social Services Administrative Court, the Administrative Law 
Judge found Petitioner legally obligated, pursuant to the 
Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann., 1953, §78-45b-l 
to 24 (Supp. 1985) (the Act), to reimburse the Department for 
funds it had advanced to Petitioner's former husband for the 
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support of their children in the amount of $125.00 for child 
support arrearages, and $25.00 per month for ongoing child 
support. (R.36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Law provides that the District Courts retain juris-
diction to modify child support orders of Divorce Decrees. 
Until a Decree is properly modified, any issues already ad-
dressed are res judicata as to the rights and obligations of 
the parties. The State Department of Social Services may not 
modify an existing support order through an administrative 
proceeding. The Department of Social Services has the authori-
ty to collect unpaid support debts that accrue under existing 
court orders, and in some instances where no order exists. 
This authority to collect child support does not include the 
right to administratively redetermine a party's support obliga-
tion when a prior court order has already allocated the obliga-
tion. When a judicial modification of an existing support 
obligation is proper, prior case law in this jurisdiction has 
held that only^prospective and not retroactive modification is 
permissible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHERE PETITIONER'S DIVORCE DECREE 
SPECIFIES THAT HER FORMER SPOUSE MUST PAY 
CHILD SUPPORT TO HER BUT DOES NOT OBLIGATE HER 
TO PAY SUPPORT TO HIM, THE MATTER IS RES JUDICATA 
AS TO THE ISSUE OF PETITIONER'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
The Petitioner's Divorce Decree does not order her to pay 
any child support to Mr. Hutchinson. A valid court order 
exists setting forth support obligations regarding Petitioner's 
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children. Though either party could have sought a modification 
of that order when physical custody of the children changed, 
neither attempted to modify the decree. Mr. Hutchinson is the 
sole party ordered to pay child support under the Divorce 
Decree. 
The rights of the Department are derivative and no greater 
than the rights of Mr. Hutchinson. U.C.A., 1953 §78-45b-3 
(Supp. 1985). The Divorce Decree does not give Mr. Hutchinson 
the right to collect child support from his former spouse. 
This Court has held that when a wife seeks temporary child 
support during a divorce proceeding but the court's order makes 
no provision for such support, the matter is res judicata and 
the Department is precluded from seeking reimbursement for that 
period. Mecham v. Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
Similarly, this court has specifically held that a paren-
tal support obligation is res judicata where a Divorce Decree 
orders one spouse to pay child support, but does not order the 
other spouse to pay support. Karren v. Department of Social 
Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986). In Karren, this court held 
that an existing court order between the parties barred the 
Department from seeking reimbursement from the spouse who was 
not ordered to pay child support. 
One of the few times that the Department is not bound by 
existing orders is when it does not receive notice of the 
pending adjudication of support duties. Knudson v. Utah State 
Department of Social Services, 660 P.2d 258 (Utah 1983). In 
Knudson, this court held that the Department's subrogated 
.
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rights to child support payments required that the Department 
be given the necessary notice to intervene and enforce the 
support obligation. In both Knudson and Mecham, the Department 
sought recovery of assistance rendered during the pendency of 
the divorce proceedings. In the present case, the Department 
assisted Petitioner's former spouse after the Divorce Decree 
was entered. Unlike Knudson, the Divorce Decree adjudicating 
support obligations in this case was entered prior to the 
payment of any assistance by the Department of Social Services. 
The Department therefore had no interest in the support ques-
tion at the time of the Petitioner's Decree, and Knudson is not 
controlling. 
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata renders 
a final judgment, on the merits, by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, conclusive upon the parties and is a bar to 
subsequent litigation of the same issues. Bernard v. Attebury, 
629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981). In the present case, the court has 
allocated child support and the Petitioner was not ordered to 
pay it. The Petitioner's duty of child support has been fixed, 
an order exists, and the issue is res judicata. In so allocat-
ing child support, the court is not obligated to add that 
support from the other party is not ordered. It is sufficient 
that child support was a material issue that was actually 
adjudicated, and that the Petitioner was not ordered to pay it. 
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II. MODIFICATION OF A COURT-ORDERED 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE MADE IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. 
A modification of a support obligation must be made 
through a court rather than an administrative proceeding. 
U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1985). Utah law grants to the 
District Court the power to enter child custody and support 
decrees, and also provides the court with continuing jurisdic-
tion to make subsequent changes or new orders for custody or 
support of the children: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property as is reasonable 
and necessary. U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5(3) 
(Supp. 1985). 
This section provides the District Court the exclusive juris-
diction to modify a support decree later on if circumstances 
change. Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981). 
Under the Act, the Department is given the power to 
collect unpaid support debts that accrue under existing court 
orders, and in some instances where no order exists. U.C.A., 
1953 §78-45b-4 and -5 (Supp. 1985). However, neither the Act 
Section 30-3-5(3) grants the power to the Department to modify 
an already existing support order in an administrative action. 
The power to modify a decree is exclusively retained by the 
courts under U.C.A., 1953, §30-3-5 (Supp. 1985). Thus, the 
Department may not redetermine Petitioner's support obligation 
through an administrative proceeding. Karren, 716 P.2d at 812; 
Mecham, 576 P.2d at 125. 
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This court has held that an action based on the Public 
Support of Children Act is not the proper procedure to modify a 
Divorce Decree. Karren, 716 P.2d at 812. The Petitioner does 
not claim that she may never be required to provide additional 
support for her children. She merely claims that in order for 
that duty of support to be changed, the existing court order 
must be properly modified. 
While acknowledging that in some cases the duty of support 
and an appropriate amount of support may be determined in an 
administrative proceeding, the Karren court held that the 
Department could not seek reimbursement when there had been a 
decree of divorce previously entered fixing the amount of 
support and/or alimony to be paid. The court determined that 
the Department may not unilaterally determine the amount of 
support and then enforce the right of reimbursement under the 
Act. The same principle applies to Petitioner in the instant 
case: the Department may not unilaterally determine that the 
Petitioner is obligated to provide child support when a court 
order providing otherwise exists. 
III. MODIFICATION OF AN EXISTING SUPPORT 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE IMPOSED 
RETROACTIVELY, BUT ONLY PROSPECTIVELY. 
The law of this state only allows an existing support 
obligation to be modified prospectively and not retroactively. 
Karren, 716 P.2d at 812; Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 
1977). Alimony and support payments become unalterable debts 
as they accrue. A periodic installment cannot be changed or 
modified after installments have become due. Karren, 716 P.2d 
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at 812. In Larsen the Department sought a judgment for child 
support funds that the Department had already provided up to 
that point. This court rejected the argument for retroactive 
support, holding that a modification could not apply to periods 
of time in the past, regardless of the circumstances, since the 
Divorce Decree. Thus, only prospective modification of a 
support obligation is proper. Karren, 716 P.2d at 812. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner's obligation to pay child support has been 
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, and she was 
not ordered to make support payments. The issue of a support 
obligation is thus res judicata as to the Department's claim of 
reimbursement against the Petitioner, and the Petitioner has 
the right to rely on the finality and enforceability of that 
judgment. 
The law of this state does not allow the Department of 
Social Services to modify a Divorce Decree through an adminis-
trative proceeding. If circumstances justify a modification, 
the Department must follow the proper procedure and petition 
the court for a modification. The Departments unilateral 
modification of an existing court order was both improper and 
unlawful. 
If circumstances change and the existing order is modi-
fied, the law in this jurisdiction only provides for prospec-
tive, and not retroactive, modification. 
Therefore, the decision of the Department of Social 
Services Administrative Court should be reversed and Petitioner 
- 8 -
should be held harmless from a child support obligation owed to 
the Department for the time period in question. 
DATED t h i s j D day of Cv J/IMAAJ^CV , 1987. 
CUtflSA L. BAKER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN ACT 
Utah Code Ann., 1953 §78-45b-l-24 A 
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON V. JOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON 
Decree of Divorce, Third District Court 
State of Utah, June 15, 1972 B 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, NOVEMBER 23, 1983 C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
June 19, 1986 D 
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Chapter 45b. Public Support of Children 
7g-4Sb-l. Short title. 
7S-45b-l.l. Common-law and statutory remedies 
augmented by act * Publk policy* 
7S-45b-2. DeflnJiious. 
7t-45b-3. Applicant's right to sopport from other potty 
assigned to department • Enforcement. 
7S«45b-3.5. Collection of support debt upon redoes! of 
agency of another state. 
7g-45b-4. Notice of support debt • Court order. 
7M55-5. Notice of support debt - Absent court order. 
7g-45b-6. Person aggrieved by action of department < 
Hearing - Request In writing • Time • Location of 
bearing • Hearing examiner determination and record 
Alleged responsible parent failing to appear. 
7M5b-6.1. Findings and order by department • 
J udJcimT review. 
7M5b;7. Uens authorized • Probable cause and 
procedure. 
7g-45b-8. Show cause order • Procedure • Hearing. 
7g~45b-9. Filing and docketing of final orders • Liens 
• Execution. 
7l45b*9.5. Docketing of final order • Issuance of writ 
of execution or garnishment. 
7a-45b~10. Effect of lien. 
78-45b-ll. Collection of support debt In ben -
Procedure • Alternative remedy. 
7g-45b~12* Executed lien - Rights of persons owning 
property. 
7M5b-13. Requirement to honor voluntary assignment 
of earnings • Discharge of employee prohibited « 
Liability for discharge • Earnings subject to support Den 
or garnishment. 
7S-4Sb-14. Recovery against obligor • Disbursement. 
7g-45b*15. Attorney general • Power to grant Immunity 
• Privileged testimony - Person refusing to answer 
questions or product evidence • Procedure for attorney 
general • Procedure for court - Effect on witness. 
7l-45b-16. Department release. 
7MSb-17. Power of department over schedule of 
payments. 
7g-45b-!7.1. Posting of bond or security for payment of 
support debt. 
7M5b-lS. Extensions of time for good cause anthorired 
• Service of documents. 
7M5b-19. Actions involving orders prohibited unless 
plaintiff applies to department for bearing. 
7g-45b-20. Conflict of orders. 
7t-45b-21. Charge off of uncoliectibte support debts., 
7M5b-22. Repealed. 
7M5b*23. Medical and dental expenses of dependent 
children • Assigning responsibility for payment 
Insurance coverage provision in order. 
78-45b-24. Provision of support debt information to 
consumer reporting agency. 
78-45b*l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may J>c cited as 
•Public Support of Children Act.* i 
78-45b-l.l. Common-law and statutory 
remedies augmented by act • Public policy. 
The State of Utah, exercising its police and i 
reign power, declares that the common-law 
statutory remedies pertaining to family de 
and nonsupport of minor dependent children 
be augmented by this act which is directed to 
real and personal property resources of the respon 
sible parents. In order to render resources mor 
immediately available to meet the needs of mino 
children, it is the legislative intent that the remedie 
herein provided are in addition to, and not in Iieul 
of, Existing law. It is declared to be the public policy] 
of this state that this chapter be liberally couuoicdl 
and administered to the end that children shall bcT E x h i b i t A 
I the UTAH AOV REPORTS £S&*2i 
parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in 
part, the burden often bonie by the general citizenry 
ihrough welfare programs. ttn 
1M5b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Department* means the State Department of 
Social Services. 
(2) "Dependent child" means any person under 
ihc age of 18 who is not otherwise emancipated, self-
supporting, married, or a member of the armed 
forces of the United States. 
(3) "Court order" means any judgment or order 
of any district court of this state or of any court of 
comparable jurisdiction of another state ordering 
payment of a set or determinable amount of support 
money. 
(4) "Order" means an order issued in any proce-
eding under this chapter by an administrative law 
judge after a hearing and a determination of both 
the ability of the obligor to pay and the need of the 
dependent child or children, which orders payment 
of a set or determinable amount of support money. 
(5) "Support debt" means: 
(a) the debt created by nonpayment of child 
support, maintenance, health, or dental care under 
ihe laws of this state or the decree of any court of 
appropriate jurisdiction ordering a sum to be paid 
as child support, maintenance, health, or dental 
care; and 
(b) The debt created by nonpayment of an 
obligation for the support of a spouse or former 
spouse with whom the debtor's child resides, if that 
obligation is ordered by a court of competent juri-
sdiction or an administrative body under state law, 
and if the debtor also owes a support obligation to 
the spouse's child, which is being enforced by the 
state. 
(6) "Need* means the necessary costs of food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical attendance for the 
support of any dependent child. 
(7) "Disposable earnings" means that part of the 
earnings of an individual remaining after the dedu-
ction from those earnings of all amounts required 
by law to be withheld. 
(8) "Assistance* means assistance for aid to fam-
ilies with dependent children, and public funds 
expended for the reasonable and necessary health 
and dental care of a dependent child. 
(9) "Person" includes any natural person, firm, 
corporation, association, political subdivision, or 
department. 
(10) "Responsible parent* means the natural 
parent, adoptive oarent. or stcoDarent of a depen-
dent child. 
(11) "Earnings" means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated 
as v,ages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant 
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance 
policies of any type, including unemployment com-
pensation insurance benefit payments. Earnings shall 
specifically include all gain derived from capital, 
from labor, or from both combined, including 
profit gained through sale or conversion of capital 
assets. 
(12) 'Stepparent* means a person ceremonially 
married to a child's natural or adoptive parent who 
is not the child's natural or adoptive parent or one 
living with the natural or adoptive parent as a 
comr.*.w .w spouse, whose common law marriage 
*as er mto in. a state w* "o^nizes the 
w (Uj "UDJtKor means any person owins 10111 
support. 
(14)/Obligee" means any person to whom * 
of support is owed. 
78-45b-3. Applicant's right to support from 
other party assigned to department 
Enforcement. 
(l)(a) As a condition of eligibility for asslsti 
an applicant for or recipient of assistance is c 
dered to have assigned to the state all right 
support from any other person which have ace 
at the time the assignment is executed or (if no 
executed) at the time of application for assisti 
and which the applicant or recipient may have i 
or her own behalf or in behalf of any other fi 
member for whom the applicant or recipiei 
applying for or receiving assistance. Any rig! 
support which an applicant or recipient of p 
assistance has or claims, passes to the state 1 
the assignment, or by operation of law upon re 
of assistance by the recipient even if the reci 
does not execute an assignment. If assistan 
furnished by the department or if the depart 
has contracted to collect support, the depart 
shall become trustee of any cause of actio 
claims of the obligee or any minor child in 
obligee's custody, to recover support due to 
obligee from any person and may bring and 1 
tain the action either in its own name or in the i 
of the obligee. 
(b) The department shall have the pow< 
attorney to act in the name of any recipient in 
orsing and cashing any and all drafts, ch 
money orders or other negotiable instruments 
ived by the department and representing suj 
payments for children in whose behalf assistanc 
been previously paid. 
(2) In any action filed under this, chapter 
department shall be deemed a real pafty in ini 
upon the payment of any support. Every ot 
shall be deemed to have received noticfe of the 1 
of the department by his failure to provide ax 
the obligee's receipt of support. 
(3) All obligees, upon request of the depart! 
shall execute and deliver such instruments 
papers and do whatever else is necessary in co 
tion with such cause of action. No obligee shj 
anything, after the receipt of assistance fron 
department, to prejudice those rights. 
(4) No agreement between any obligee anc 
obligor either relieving an obligor of any du 
support or responsibility therefor or purportii 
settle past, present, or future support obligj 
either as settlement or prepayment shall a 
reduce or terminate any rights of the departnu 
recover from that obligor for support pro 
unless the department has consented to the 1 
ment in writing. 
(5) Any court order embodying a money judj 
for support to be paid to an obligee by any p 
shall be deemed in favor of the department t 
extent of the amount of the department's rigt 
recover from the judgment debtor. This transl 
interest shall be applicable to court orders inclu 
but not limited to, temporary spouse support 01 
family maintenance orders, or alimony order 
the benefit of a dependent child but allocated I 
benefit of that child on the basis of providini 
essities to the person in whose custody that d 
dent child resides. 
(6) The department shall have the right to pc 
aoic 10 ao so. 
(7) The department is hereby authorized to udopt 
and enforce such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, 
including but not limited to rules for narrowing 
issues and simplifying^ the methods of proof at 
hearings, such rules and regulations shall include 
procedures for notice and the manner of serving the 
same on all orders of support debt or any hearings 
requested regarding contested decisions. Such rules 
may be changed from time to time at the depart-
ment's discretion. 
(8) The department for the purposes mentioned in 
this title, through its director or his authorized rep-
resentatives, shall have power to administer oaths to 
certify to official acts, issue subpoenas, compel 
witnesses and the production of books, accounts, 
documents, and evidence. 
(9) In enforcing this title, and notwithstanding 
other provisions to the contrary, the department 
shall have the power to assess interest not to exceed 
1% per month on any amounts due and not paid 
within one month. All notices and bills issued by the 
department to obligors shall advise the obligor of 
the department's power to assess interest and the 
amount thereof, if assessed. Such amount shall be 
added to and accrued as arrearages until paid. ttu 
78-45b-3.5. Collection of support debt upon 
request of agency of another state. 
(1) The department may proceed under Section 78-
45b-3 to collect a support debt from an obligor 
who is located In or is a resident of this state rega-
rdless of the presence or residence of the obligee, if 
that action is requested by an agency of another 
state which is operating under Title IV-D of the 
Social Security Act. 
(2) If the department proceeds against an obligor 
under Subsection (1), it shall seek enforcement of 
the liability imposed by the laws of the state where 
the obligor was located during the period for which 
support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have 
been present in this state during that period until 
otherwise shown. 
(3) If an obligee is absent from this state and the 
obligor presents evidence which constitutes a 
defense, the administrative hearing examiner shall 
continue the case for further hearing and submission 
of evidence by both parties. 
(4) The remedies provided by this section are 
additional to those remedies provided by the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
Chapter 31, Title 77. ins 
78-45b-4. Notice of support debt • Court order. 
(1) The department may issue a notice of a 
support debt accrued or accruing based upon any 
court order and shall include a demand for immed-
iate payment of the support debt or in the alterna-
tive for a written answer from that person to the 
department setting forth any claimed defenses to 
liability, and requesting a hearing thereon, and a 
statement that if neither answer nor full payment 
are received within 20 days from the date of service 
the department may assess and determine that 
support debt according to the terms of the court 
order and that, subsequent thereto, the property of 
that person shall be subject to appropriate collection 
action including, but not limited to, execution upon 
hens, wage assignments, attachment, and garnish-
ment. This notice shall be served upon the person 
sul »-t to that court order de* - 'ng payment 
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outlined by the rulesof the department or in acco^ 
rdancc with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of. Civil Proce-
dure. 
(2) If a written answer is received by the depart-
ment, a hearing shall be set in the manner provided 
under section 78-4Sb-6 and reasonable notwe of, 
that hearing shall be forwarded to the alleged resp» 
onsible parent in the manner prescribed under sub-
section (1). 
(3) If payment \$ not received as demanded under 
subsection (1) and no written answer is Tiled within 
20 days from the date of service, the department 
may proceed to assess and determine that support 
debt according to the terms of the court order and, 
at any time thereafter, may proceed with appropr-
iate collection actions as provided in subsection (I). 
(4) If a determination of financial responsibility is 
made by the department, an order in that regard 
shall be entered by the department specifying the 
amount determined to be owing, the support debt 
accrued or.accruing and, wh$re appropriate, the 
amount to be paid thereon each month, the name of. 
the recipient or custodian, the name of the child for 
whom assistance is being paid or is to be paid, and 
a statement of the amount of periodic future 
support payments that obligor shall be responsible 
for. Notice of that order shall be given in the same 
manner provided for notices under subsection (1). 
That order shall automatically become final unless a 
hearing is requested within the time and in the 
manner provided under section 78-45b-6 and the 
order shall so state. 
(5) When a notice of support debt is properly 
served upon an obligor pursuant to this act, the 
obligor shall be responsible for notifying the depa-
rtment by certified mail, return receipt requested, of 
any change of address or employment. tw? 
78-4Sb-5. Notice of support debt • Absent court 
order. 
(1) In the absence of a court order, the director 
may issue a notice of a support debt accrued or 
accruing based upon the furnishing of support by 
the department for the benefit of any dependent 
child. That notice shall include a statement of the 
support debt accrued or accruing, computable on 
the basis of the amount of assistance paid or to be 
paid, a statement of the name of the recipient and 
the name of the minor child for whom assistance is 
.being provided, a demand for immediate payment 
of the support debt or in the alternative for a 
written answer from that person to the department 
setting forth any claimed defenses to liability, and 
requesting a hearing thereon, and a statement that if 
neither answer nor full payment are received within 
twenty days from the date of service the department 
may assess and determine that support debt and 
that, subsequent thereto, the property of that person 
shall be subject to appropriate collection action 
including, but not limited to, execution upon liens, 
wage assignments, attachment, and garnishment. 
This notice shall be served upon the alleged respo-
nsible parent in the manner prescribed for service of 
notices under section 78-45b-4. 
(2) If a written answer is received by the depart-
ment, a hearing shall be set in the manner provided 
under section 78-45b-6 and reasonable notice of 
that hearing shall be forwarded to the alleged resp-
onsible parent in the manner prescribed under 
section 78-45b-4. 
(3) If payment is not received as demanded under 
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mcnt may (proceeo 10 assess ana determine inai 
support debt and. at any time thereafter, may 
proceed with appropriate collection actions as pro-
vided in that subsection. 
(4) If a determination of financial responsibility is 
made by the department, an order in that regard 
shall be entered by the department specifying the 
amount determined to be owing, the support debt 
accrued or accruing and, where appropriate, the 
amount to be paid thereon each month, the name of 
the recipient or custodian, the name of the child for 
whom assistance is being paid or is to be paid, and 
a statement of the amount of periodic future 
support payments the obligor shall be responsible 
for. Notice of that order shall be given in the same 
manner provided for notices under section 78-45b-
4. That order shall automatically become final 
unless a hearing is requested within the time and in 
the manner provided under section 78-45b-6 and 
the order shall so state. ins 
7M5b-6. Person aggrieved by action of 
department - Hearing • Request in writing 
Time - Location of hearing - Hearing examiner 
determination and record • Alleged responsible 
parent failing to appear. 
(1) Any person aggrieved regarding notice of 
support debt or other issue of fact shall be afforded 
an opportunity for a hearing upon request in writing 
Hied with the director not more than twenty days 
after notification of the adverse action. The hearings 
provided sha\\ be conducted by admimsuative 
hearing examiners designated by the department. All 
hearings shall be held in the county of residence or 
other place convenient to such person and shall be 
so held within thirty days after request therefor is 
filed, except that the department may promulgate 
such rules for postponements and continuances as 
may be in the interest of justice. 
(2) The administrative hearing examiner, after full 
and fair hearing, conducted in accordance with the 
rules and regulations of the department shall make 
specific findings regarding the liability and respon-
sibility, if any, of the alleged responsible parent and 
the amount of such liability computable on the basis 
of the amount of assistance paid or to be paid. In 
making these findings, the hearing officer shall 
include in his deliberations the necessities and req-
uirements of the child, exclusive of any income of 
the custodian of said child, the amount of the 
support debt claimed, the amount of assistance paid 
or to be paid, the abilities and resources of the res-
ponsible parent, and the public policy and intent of 
the legislature to require that children be maintained 
from the resources of responsible parents thereby 
relieving to the greatest extent possible the burden 
upon the general citizenry through welfare prog-
rams. An official record of the hearing shall be 
made and maintained by the department. The 
hearing officer shall file his findings with the depa-
rtment, not more than twenty days after the concl-
usion of the heaiing. 
(3) if the alleged responsible parent fails to appear 
at the time and place set for hearing, upon a 
shoeing of proper notice to that parent, the hearing 
examiner shall enter his findings in accordance with 
the provisions of the notice of support payment 
unless he shall determine that no good cause ther-
efor exists. 1977 
Vij upon receipi o i me administrative ncartnj 
officer's report of findings on the issues designated 
for hearing, the department may accept the report 
of findings as the basis for a final order or upon 
filing * statement of the legal or substantial factual 
basis in the record therefor, it may: 
(a) Reject all or any portion of the findings and 
remand for further hearing and findings on specified 
issues; 
(b) Disregard any portion of the findings and 
proceed to enter a final order based upon the rem-
ainder of the findings; 
(c) Substitute alternative or additional findings 
of act on the issues designated for hearing, if the 
substituted findings are supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in the record. The department 
shall then cause its findings and order to be served 
upon the responsible parent. 
(2) When findings and an order have been entered 
by the department subsequent to a hearing, judicial 
review of those findings and order may be secured 
by any person adversely affected thereby by filing a 
petition in the district court of the county where the 
hearing was conducted within 30 days after receipt 
of notice of that order. The petition shall state the 
grounds upon which review is sought. At the time of 
the filing of the petition, a copy thereof shall be 
served upon the department, which service may be 
accomplished by mailing to the department of to the 
legal counsel who represented the department at the 
hearing. The petitioner and A t department shall in 
all cases be deemed original parties to the judicial 
review. With its answer, the department shall certify 
and file with the court all documents, exhibits, 
papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the 
matter, together with its findings and order. 
(3) Within 20 days after the filing of the answer, 
the petitioner shall file and serve a memorandum of 
points and authorities, supporting in detail the 
grounds set forth in the petition for judicial review. 
If the petitioner relies upon the transcript, he shall 
cite in the memorandum the pages and the lines in 
the transcript upon which he relies. 
(4) Within 20 days after the filing of the memor-
andum by the petitioner, the department shall file 
and serve a memorandum of answering points and 
authorities. If the department relies upon the tran-
script, the department shall cite in its memorandum 
the pages and the lines in the transcript upon which 
it relies. 
(5) Upon expiration of the time permitted for 
filing of the memorandum of answering points and 
authorities or upon the filing of the memorandum, 
either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter for decision, which shall be made without 
oral argument unless oral argument is requested by 
cither party or the court. itt3 
78-45b-7. Liens authorized - Probable cause and 
procedure. 
((1)] If the department has probable cause for 
being justly apprehensive of losing property which 
could become subject to a collection action to 
satisfy the support debt due to the fact that the 
alleged responsible parent is not a resident of this 
state, that he has assigned, disposed of or conce-
aled, or is about to assign, dispose of or conceal, 
any of his property with intent to defraud the dep-
artment, or that he has departed or is about to 
depart from tne state to the injury of the depart-
ment, the department may file and serve liens pur-
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fair hearing or thereafter, whether or not appealed. 
(2) In cases where action is taken pending a fair 
hearing the department shall Tile in the record of the 
hearing an affidavit stating the reasons for!such 
action. If the alleged debtor shall furnish bond with 
sufficient sureties, satisfactory to the department in 
an amount double the amount claimed by the dep-
artment during the pendency of the hearing or the-
reafter, in which case those hens shall be released. If 
the decision of the hearing officer shall be in favor 
of the debtor, all liens shall be released. 
(3) No execution upon liens may be instituted 
pursuant to this act, however, unless the requirem-
ents of providing notice for payment have been first 
met by the department. w s 
7S-45b-S. Show cause order • Procedure • 
Hearing. 
In addition to, or in lieu of, any other action 
provided for under this act, in the absence of a 
court order, the department may, upon petition by 
the responsible parent, or otherwise, issue an order* 
based on a material change in circumstances and 
good cause, requiring the other party to show cause 
why the order previously entered should not be 
prospectively modified. That order to show cause, 
together with a copy of any affidavit upon which it 
is based, shall be served on the other party in the 
manner of a summons in a civil action. A hearing 
thereon shall then be provided in the same manner, 
and determinations shall be based on the same 
considerations, as provided under section 78-45b-
6, but no modification shall be ordered except upon 
a showing of good cause and a material change of 
circumstances. lf7S 
7S-45b-9. Filing and docketing of final orders -
Liens • Execution. 
(1) An abstract of any final order of a support 
debt may be filed with the clerk of any district court 
in the state, and shall be docketed in the judgment 
docket of that court. The time of receipt of the 
abstract shall be noted on the abstract and entered 
in the docket. 
(2)(a) When an abstract has been filed and dock-
eted, it constitutes a lien from the time of that 
docketing upon the real and personal property of 
the obligor situated in that county, for a period of 
eight years from the date of the award, unless pre-
viously satisfied. 
(b) Execution of this lien shall be in the same 
manner and with the same effect as an execution on 
a lien which results from a judgment of the district 
court. 
(c) This lien is in addition to any other lien 
provided by law. 
(3) If the obligor or obligee has filed an action for 
divorce, a copy of the abstract shall also be filed in 
that action. ins 
7M5b-9.5. Docketing of final order - Issuance 
of writ of execution or garnishment. 
(1) Any final order issued by the department shall 
>e docketed with the department's administrative 
locket clerk. A writ of garnishment or execution 
nay be issued on the order within the same period, 
n the same manner, and with the same effect as if 
he writ were issued on a judgment of a district 
:ourt. This remedy shall be in addition to any other 
remedies provided by law for collecting* on judgm-
ents. 
(2)u) The department may at any time after 
business, employer, political subdivision, or depar-
tment of the state possessing earnings, or deposits or' 
balances, held in any bank account, or otherwise, of 
any nature, which are due, owing, or belonging to 
the obligor. 
(b) A, writ of garnishment or execution issued 
under this section shall be signed by the director of 
his designee, and shall be delivered by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, or as prescribed by Rule 4 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. mi 
7S-45b-10. Effect of lien. 
After receipt of notice of the filing of any support 
lien under this act by the department, no person In 
possession of any property which may be subject to 
that lien shall pay over, release, sell, transfer, enc-
umber, or convey such property to any person other 
than the department, unless he first receives a 
release or waiver thereof from the department, or a 
court order ordering release of the lien on the basis 
that the debt does not exist or has been satisfied. 
Whenever any such person has in his possession 
earnings, deposits, accounts, or balances in excess of 
$100 more than the amount of the debt claimed by 
the department, that person may, without liability 
under this act, release such excess to the debtor. \rn 
7S-45b-ll. Collection of support debt In lien • 
Procedure • Alternative remedy. 
Whenever a support lien has been filed pursuant 
to this act, the department may collect the support 
debt stated in said lien by the execution upon and 
sale of the property subject to said lien. The depa-
rtment shall give notice to the debtor and any 
person known to have or claim an interest therein of 
the general description of the property to be sold 
and the time and. place of sale of said property. Said 
notice shall be given to such persons by service in 
the manner prescribed for the service of a summons 
in a civil action. A notice specifying the property to 
be sold shall be posted in at least two public places 
in the county wherein the seizure has been made. 
The time of sale shall not be less than ten nor more 
than twenty days from the date of posting of such 
notices. Said sale shall be conducted by the depart-
ment which shall proceed to sell such property by 
parcel or by lot at a public auction, and which may 
set a minimum reasonable price to include the exp-
enses of making a levy and of advertising the sale/ 
and if the amount bid for such property at the sale 
is not equal to the price so fixed, the department 
may declare such property to be purchased by the 
department for such price, or may conduct another 
sale of such property pursuant to the provisions of 
this section. Property as herein prescribed may be 
sold by the director at public or private sale, and the 
amount realized shall be placed in the state general 
fund to the credit of the department. In all cases of 
such sale, the director shall issue a bill of sale or 
deed to the purchaser and said bill of sale or deed 
shall be prima facie evidence of the right of the 
director to make such sale and conclusive evidence 
of the regularity of his proceeding in making the 
sale, and shall transfer to the purchaser all right, 
title, and interest of the debtor in said property. The 
proceeds of any such sale, except in those cases 
wherein the property has been acquired by the dep-
artment, shall be first applied by the director to 
reimbursement of the costs of sale, including reas-
onable attorneys9 fees and, thereafter, in satisfac-
tion of the delinquent account. Any excess which 
shall thereafter remain in the hands of the director 
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km debt, costs and reasonable attorney fees, at any 
-JOT before sale, shall satisfy the lien and terminate 
farther procedures. Wher^ the net proceeds o f sale 
:pon application to the debt claimed d o not satisfy 
k debt in full, the department shall have judgment 
3ver for any deficiency remaining unsatisf ied. and 
liriher levy and sales upon other property o f the 
•udgment debtor may be made under the same exe-
rtion, in all sales contemplated under this sect ion, 
Jvenising of notice shall only be necessary for t w o 
•eeks in a newspaper published in the county where 
aid property is located, and if there be no newsp-
iper therein, then in the most convenient newspaper 
'jving a circulation in such county . Remedies pro-
ved for herein arc alternatives to remedies prov-
ed for in other sections o f this chapter. 1977 
*W5b-12. Executed lien - Rights of persons 
•»Qtng property. 
Any person owning real property, or any interest 
£ real property, against which a support lien has 
been executed upon pursuant to section 78-45b-
!!, shall have the right, prior to sale, to pay the 
rcount due, together with expenses o f the procee-
±ig> and reasonable attorneys' fees, to the depar-
rrnt and upon such payment the department shall 
rntorc that property to him and all further execu-
t e proceedings shall cease. A n y such person shall 
ilso have the right, within ninety days after sale o f 
u:h property under section 78-455-11 to redeem 
u.d property by making payment to the purchase 
> i in the amount paid by the purchaser plus inte-
rn ihereon at the rate of 6% per annum. 1975 
*M$b-13. Requirement to honor voluntary 
isiignment of earnings - Discharge of employee 
prohibited - Liability for discharge - Earnings 
tubject to support lien or garnishment. 
|1) Every person, firm, corporat ion, association, 
jehtical subdivision, or department of the state shall 
Wnor according to its terms, a duly executed volu-
:ur> assignment o f earnings which is presented by 
t< department as a plan to satisfy or retire a 
import debt or obl igat ion. This requirement to 
fcror the assignment o f earnings and the assign-
t:ru of earnings itself shall be applicable whether 
uJ earnings are to be paid presently or in the 
V.urc and shall continue in effect until released in 
•raing by the department. Payment o f moneys 
r-rsuant to an assignment o f earnings presented by 
X department shall serve as full acquittance under 
r> contract of employment , and the state shall 
fcfend the employer and hold him harmless for any 
raon taken pursuant to the assignment o f earnings. 
!>.e department shall be released from liability for 
^proper receipt o f moneys under an assignment o f 
agings upon return of any moneys so received. 
(2) No employer may discharge or prejudice any 
rployee by reason o f the fact that his earnings 
INC been subjected to support lien, wage assign-
or!!, or garnishment for any indebtedness under 
(3) Should any person discharge an employee in 
oiation of Subsection (2), that person shall be 
jb!e to the employee for such damages as he may 
wffcr, and, additionally, to the department in an 
r.aunt equal to the debt which is the basis o f the 
alignment plus costs , interest, and attorneys' fees, 
ximaximum of $1 ,000, whichever is less. 
(4) The maximum part o f the aggregate disposable 
- rgi of an trJiviJual for any work pay period 
»* ;h may be subjected to a support lien or garni-
•rx to enforce payment o f a judgment arising 
not exceed SCWt or nis atsposaoic coming* • « . ...» 
work pay period. 
(5) Whenever a support lien or • garnishment is 
served upon any person, asserting a support debt 
against earnings a n d there is in the possession o f 
such person any such earnings, 5 0 % of the dispos-
able earnings shall be disbursed to the debtor 
whether such earnings are paid, or are to be paid 
weekly, monthly , or at other regular intervals and 
whether there be due the debtor earnings for o n e 
week or for a longer period. The support lien or 
garnishment shall continue to operate and require 
said person to withhold the nonexempt portion o f 
earnings at each succeeding earnings disbursement 
interval until released in writing from the depart-
ment. 19*4 
78-45b-14. Recovery against obligor • 
Disbursement. 
If any recovery is obtained against an obl igor, 
pursuant to this act, it shall be disbursed as fol lows: 
(1) The reasonable expense o f the act ion, inclu-
ding attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their interests 
may appear. N o attorneys* fees chargeable to the 
department may exceed 15% of any such recovery. 
Such fee is to be a credit upon any fee payable by 
the obligee for any recovery had against an obligor. 
Before proceeding against an obligor, an obligee 
shall give written notice o f such intention to the 
department, in order to give that department a rea-
sonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the 
proceeding. 
(2) The department shall be reimbursed in full for 
all payments made less the proportionate share o f 
costs and attorneys' fees as provided in subsection 
(1). 
(3) The balance of any Such recovery, after 
payment of those items provided in subsections (1) 
and (2), shall be paid to the obligee. 1975 
78-45b-15. Attorney general - Power to grant 
immunity - Privileged testimony - Person 
refusing to answer questions or produce evidence 
- Procedure for attorney general - Procedure 
for court - Effect on witness. 
In any investigation or prosecution of any proce-
eding against an obligor seeking adjudication of 
support rights of an obligee or dependent child, 
whether by way of paternity proceedings, divorce 
proceedings, orders to show cause, temporary 
support proceedings, family maintenance proceed-
ings, or other similar proceedings, the attorney 
general shall have the power to grant immunity 
from prosecution to any obligor, putative father, 
mother of a child born out of wedlock or determ-
ined not to be the issue of a marriage, or any other 
person who is called or intended to be called, as a 
witness whenever he deems that the testimony of 
such person is necessary to the proper determination 
of that proceeding. N o prosecution shall be instit-
uted against the person for any crime disclosed by 
his testimony which is privileged under this action; 
however, should that person testify falsely, nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to prevent pro-
secution for perjury. 
If, during the investigation or prosecution, a 
person refuses to answer questions or produce evi-
dence of any kind on the ground that he may be 
incriminated thereby, the attorney general may file a 
request in writing with the district court in which the 
examination is being conducted for an order requi-
ring that person to answer the question or produce 
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the court to sbo* cause, if any he has, why the 
question should no* be answered of the, evidence 
produced, and the court shall order the question 
answered or the evidence produced unless it finds 
that to do so would be dearly contrary to the public 
interest, or could subject the witness to a criminal 
prosecution in another jurisdiction. If the witness 
still refuses to answer or produce the evidence, he 
shall be guilty of contempt of court and punished 
accordingly. If the witness comptics with the order 
and he would have been privileged to withhold the 
answer given or the evidence produced by him 
except for this section, that person shall not be 
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture on 
account of any fact or act concerning which he was 
ordered to answer or produce evidence except he 
may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to 
penalty for any perjury, false swearing or contempt 
committed in answering, failing to answer, or for 
producing or failing to produce any evidence in 
accordance with the order, tfis 
7S-45b-16. Department release. 
The department may at any time release a support 
lien, wage assignment, attachment of garnishment, 
on all or part of the property of the debtor, or 
return seized property without liability, if assurance 
of payment is deemed adequate by the department 
or if said action will facilitate the collection of the 
debt, but said release or return shall not operate to 
prevent future action to collect from the same or 
other property. The department may also waive any 
provisions providing for the collection of interest on 
accounts due, if such waiver would facilitate the 
collection of the debt, w$ 
7S-45b-17. Power of department over schedule of 
payments. 
The department may at any time consistent with 
the income, earning capacity and resources of the 
debtor, set or reset a level and schedule of payments 
to be paid upon the debt and may cancel such sch-
edule of payments and demand payment in full at 
any time he is justly apprehensive, as set forth in 
section 78-45b-7, of losing property which could 
become subject to a collection action to satisfy the 
support debt. l*& 
7*-45b-17J. Potting ot bond or security for 
payment of support debt. 
(l)(a) The department shall, or an obligee may, 
petition the court for an order requiring an obligor 
to post a bond or provide other security for the 
payment of a support debt, when the department or 
an obligee determines that action is appropriate, if 
the payments arc more than 90 days delinquent. The 
department shall establish rules for determining 
when it shall seek an order for security. 
(b) For purposes of this section, 'support debt* 
includes court ordered obligations for the support of 
a spouse or former spouse with whom the child 
resides, if that support is collected with the child 
support. 
(2) When the department or an obligee petitions 
the court under this section, it shall give written 
notice to the obligor, stating: 
(a) the amount of support debt; 
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order 
requiring the obligor to post security; and 
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear 
before the court and con?- fhe department's or 
obligee's petition. 
other security to be deposited upon the depart-
ment's or obligee's showing of a support deft ind 
of * reasonable basis for the security. Ms 
7M5b48. Extensions of tb»t for good C M * 
authorized . Service of documents. 
(1) Whenever, for good cause, it appear! that Art 
extension of time should be given in relation to thy 
proceedings under this act, the ume shall be 
granted. 
(2) The manner provided for service of any doc-
uments under this act shall be in addition to other 
manners of service provided by law. w s 
7I-45M9. Actions involving orders prohibited 
unless plaintiff applies to department for bearing. 
No action, proceeding, or suit to set aside, vacate, 
or amend an order issued under this chapter, may 
be brought unless the plaintiff first applies to the 
department for a hearing on every issue to be pres-
ented in the action, proceeding, or suit. m* 
7S-45b-20. Conflict of orders. 
If any order pursuant to this act is, or becomes, 
in conflict with any order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, to the extent of such conflict the court 
order shall govern. tsrs 
7«*45b-2l» Charge off of uncollectible support 
debts. 
The department may charge off as uncollectible 
any support debt upon which it finds there is no 
available, practical and lawful means by which that 
debt may be collected and may transfer those acco-
unts from accounts receivable to a suspense account 
and cease to account for them as assets. ttrs 
78*45b-22. Repealed. tm 
7M5b-23. Medical and dental expenses of 
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for 
payment • Insurance coverage provision in 
order. 
In any action under this chapter the department 
or the administrative hearing examiner shall include 
in its order a provision assigning responsibility for 
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children. If 
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the dep-
artment or the examiner may also include a provi-
sion requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insur-
ance for those children. ISM 
7ft*45b-24. Provision or support debt information 
to consumer reporting agency. 
(1) As used in this section "consumer reporting 
agency" means any person who, for monetary fees, 
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly 
assembles or evaluates consumer credit information 
bearing on credit worthiness, standing or capacity, 
for the purpose of furnishing consumer credit 
reports to third parties. 
(2) The department shall supply information reg-
arding a support debt in excess of $1,000 to any 
consumer reporting agency only upon its request. 
(3) The department may supply information reg-
arding a support debt of $1,000 or less to a cons-
umer reporting agency only upon its request. 
(4) Before it supplies any information to a cons-
umer reporting agency under this section, the dep-
artment shall give written notice to the obligor, 
specifying the information which will be disclosed to 
the consumer reporting agency and providing the 
obligor with a reasonable opportunity to contest the 
accuracy of the information in an administrative 
?50 l\, * ^ WOT^Tto^s, pitas* coMttlt the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code* Co rro*atUuh 
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1986-1987 Judicial Code 
hearing. 
(5) The department shall establish rules Impleme-
nting this section. 
(6) The department may charge, the consumer 
reporting agency a fee for furnishing information 
under this section. That fee may not exceed the 
department's actual cost of providing the informa-
tion. 
(7) The notice provisions of this section do not 
apply to a support debt which has been reduced to 
judgment and is public information. ins 
LELAND K. MMER 
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f w' 
60C Utaji S a v i n g s Bu i ld ing * 
S a l t Lake C i t j , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : 3 6 4 - 3 6 2 5 
***************-* * * * . * - * ' * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIPD JUDICAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
~&S /At AtC, Z&66 
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON, * £ -£# ~7£ — f-Sf A H 
plaintiff. : " 
: D E C R E E OF DIVORCE 
- V 3 - : 
iOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON, : C i v i l No. D-6455 
defendant. : 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This cause having come on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of June 
1972 before the honorable Emmett L» Brown with plaintiff being present *pd 
represented by counsel, defendant not present nor represented by counsel, the 
Court taking notice of more than 90 days elapsed since filing of plaintiffs 
complaint and defendants being duly served with process having failed ta 
respond to this action in the time allowed by law^ defendant's default was duly 
entered. Plaintiff being »worn and from her testimony adduced the Court being 
fully advised in the premises having made and entered its Findings of Facts 
and Conclusionsof Law; now on motion Of Leland K* Wimmer, it i s hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED nd D E C R E E D : 
1. That plaintiff be and she is awarded divorce from defendant and each of 
the parties is restored to the status of an unmarried person freed from their 
bons of matrimony, provided however, that this decree shall not become 
final and absolute until the expiration of three months from date of signing by 
judge and entry hereof, provided further, that this decree shall become final 
and absolute upon said expiration of three months unless the appeal is pending 
or the Court upon its own motion or application of any other person, whether 
interested or nd . otherwise orders. 
2. Plaintiff be and she is awarded the sole CARE, CUSTODY and CONTROL 
of Diana Michele Hutchinson, born January 2, 1967, and John Collins Hutchinson, 
born April 29, 1969, subject to rights of defendant to <nsit said children at 
reasonable times and places in accordance with their ages and his facilities. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant who is rdered to pay to 
the sum of Jl^O.00 per month as alimony for the plaintiff for a total of $220.00 
each month payable through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk, Support 
and Alimony division, at the rate of $110..00 on the 20th day of June 1972, 
$110. 00 on the 5th day of July, $110.00 on the 20th da^ of July 1972 and s imi! ir 
amounts on the 5th and 20th of each month thereafter. 
4. Plaintiff be and she is awarded as her sole and separate property the 
1961 Ford Falcon, all furniture, appliances, furnishings and effects which are, 
in her personal possession and ccntroL 
5. Defendant be and he is awarded as his sole and separate property the 
1945 Dodge Pickup, his fishing and hunting equipment and his personal effects. 
6. Plaintiff be and she is awarded against defendant an additional judgment 
in the sum of $250. 00 as attorney fees for the mseand benefit of her attorney 
herein together with judgment in the sum of $6„60 for- costs of Court and 
specifically reserving the judgment of *75. 00 .as temporary attorneys: fees for 
the Order To Show Cause hearing. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded against defendant further-judgment in the amount of 
$300. 00 as arrears of temporary child support and alimony in this matter. 
8. Defendant is ordered to pay and discharge and hold harmless the plaintiff 
form all such obligations and indebtedness of the family incurred during the 
marriage including by not limited to Granite Furniture Company, Sugarhouse 
Appliance Co. , AETNA loan Company and Lincoln Loan Company. 
D a t e d t h i s 1 5 t h day of June A ^ D . 1 9 7 2 . 
ATTEST B * t h e C^C **••.; . 
• * -+"*— !*«£»««* DISTRTCT JJJDGE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct .copy of the foregoing Decree 
? UTAH ) ofDivorce to defendant, John Collins Hutchinson, 1245Garoette'Streeet, Salt Lake 
OFSALTLAKE ) _. City, Utah84116, this 15th day of June 1972. 
UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
|)F SALT LAKE~COUNTY, UTAH, DO HERESY 
THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS 
[AND FULL COPY CF AN ORIGINAL DOCO 
|4 FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
| S %fCf HAND AND SEA£ OF SAID C0JJR7 
p£H)AY OF /Q*Z~r 19^u2L 
1 ^ < ^ ^ ^ ? ^ ^ ^ - DEPUTY 
•STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
STATE OF UTAH 
Department of Social Services. 
Plaintiff, 
-V-
MARSHA LEE STARKS. 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS 
: AND ORDER 
: Case No. 90099582R1 
T-12 
The above-entitled matter came for hearing on the 21st day of 
October, 1983, before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, 
with the State of Utah represented by Paul D. Vernieu. Deputy Weber 
County Attorney, and the defendant appearing personally and repre-
sented through counsel. Leland K. Wimmer. 
Thereafter, based upon evidence proffered by .counsel for both 
parties, the Administrative Law Judge now enters his Statement of 
Facts, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John C. Hutchison and the defendant were married, having two 
children born as issue of that marriage, to wit: Diana Michele and 
John Collins, Jr. Pursuant to a Divorce Decree, dated June 15. 1972. 
custody of the just-named children was awarded to the defendant and 
Mr. Hutchison was ordered to pay child support of Sixty dollars 
($60.00) per month per child. 
Based upon a subsequent agreement between Mr. Hutchison and the 
defendant. Diana Michele ceased residing with the defendant sometime 
in October,.1982. Two months later, aqain pursuant to an agreement 
between Mr. Hutchison and the defendant, John Collins ceased residing 
with the defendant and commenced living with Mr. Hutchison. 
During the period of time under review, which consists of June, 
1983 through October, 1983, Diana Michele has continuously resided 
with Mr. Hutchison. Based on the believable evidence which was 
presented during the hearing in question, John Collins ceased 
residing with Mr. Hutchison in mid-May, 1983 and has resided with 
the defendant since that time. 
From June. 1983 through October, 1983, Mr. Hutchison has 
received public assistance totaling Seven hundred forty-five dollars 
($745.00). which had been provided for the support of the above-
named two children. Specifically, said assistance was provided for 
both children during June. 1983 and July, 1983. Since August, 1983, 
public assistance has only been provided for the support of one 
dependent child. The amount of monthly assistance so provided has 
been reduced from a full one or two-person grant, inasmuch as 
Mr. Hutchison has had some income from employment during the five 
months under review. 
The child support arrearages allegedly owed by the defendant for 
the public assistance which has been provided have been computed at 
the rate of Sixty dollars ($60.00) per month per child, or a total 
of Four hundred twenty dollars ($420.00). The claimed child support 
arrearages have been computed on the basis of that amount of monthly 
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child support which Mr. Hutchison was ordered to pay. as set forth 
in the parties1 Divorce Decree. The defendant has made no payments 
toward the satisfaction of any alleged obligation to have provided 
child support for either and/or both of the children in question 
during the period of time under review. 
The defendant was unemployed during the five months in question. 
Specifically, the defendant has been so unemployed since May. 1982. 
at which time her employment was terminated due to a reduction in 
force. At the time of her termination from employment, the defendant 
earned Five dollars and forty cents ($5.40) per hour. During the 
hearing, the defendant testified that she does not anticipate being 
reemployed for possibly one to two years. 
The defendant's present household consists of herself, her hus-
band. John Collins, Jr.. and another child from a previous marriage. 
The defendant is pregnant, it being expected that said child will be 
born in January. 1984. 
From the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge now makes his 
Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The defendant asserts that the existing Divorce Decree has never 
been modified to require payment by her in satisfaction of any obli-
gation to support the two children in question. Thus, the defendant 
asserts that the instant matter should be dismissed and she not be 
required to provide any reimbursement to the State of Utah for the 
public assistance which has been provided for the support of those 
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two children. In that respect, the defendant contends that 
Mr. Hutchison failed to make payment of his child support obligation 
during prior periods of time that the two children resided with her 
and that, although she anticipates that one of those children (John 
Collins, Jr.) will continue to reside with her, she cannot afford to 
also have physical custody of the other child absent the payment of 
support for those children by Mr. Hutchison. Rather, the defendant 
asserts that Mr. Hutchison is physically able to work and it is he 
who should provide support for the children in question. 
Section 78-45b-3(l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
•In the event that assistance is furnished by the 
department..., the department shall become 
trustee of any cause of action of the obligee or 
any minor child in that obligee's custody, to 
recover support due to that obligee from any 
person and may bring and maintain the action 
either in its own name or in the name of the 
obligee." 
Section 78-45b-3(2) further provides: 
•For purposes of prosecuting any action pursuant 
to this act, the department shall be deemed a 
real party in interest upon the payment of any 
support...." 
Section 78-45-4 requires every woman to support her dependent 
children. In State Division of Family Services v. Clark. Utah. 554 
P.2d 1310 (1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
•The universally recognized rule is that according 
to the common consent and customs of mankind one 
of the implied promises in the marriage contract 
is to support any children that may have been 
born into the family. Even more fundamentally. 
the duty of parents to support their children 
derives from natural law. This is been recognized 
from the earliest times as a proposition of such 
incontestable correctness that it is neither 
subject to doubt nor in need of explanatory 
justification— 
Importantly, the Court also stated: 
MA necessary concomitant of the continuing and 
inalienable duty of parents to support their 
children is that if a child is left in need and a 
third person comes to the rescue and furnishes 
support, the latter is subrogated to the child's 
right and may obtain reimbursement therefor." 
See also Gulley v. Gulley, Utah, 570 P.2d 127 (1977). 
Clearly, based on the provisions of §78-45-3, which requires 
every man to support his dependent children, and §78-45-4, quoted 
above, the financial responsibility for the support of children is a 
joint and several obligation of both parents. As was stated in Owen 
v. Owen, Utah, 579 P.2d 911 (1978): 
•[U]nder our law both the mother and the father 
are responsible for the support of the children. 
Therefore, even though in the decree the duty of 
support was placed primarily and mostly upon the 
defendant [who was, in that case, the father of 
the children], the trial court is not necessarily 
obligated to continue that burden entirely and 
exclusively upon him." 
It should be further recognized is that each parent's statutorily 
mandated obligation to provide child support impliedly becomes a 
part of every divorce decree involving the welfare of the children 
of a marriage. See Rose v. Rose. Wyo., 576 P.2d 459 (1978). 
While it is true that the general rule is that the divorce 
decree fixes the obligations of the parties, Stanton v. Stanton, 30 
Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974), and that where the circumstances 
would so justify, the trial court may relieve a parent from the 
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obligation to provide child support, Farbush v. Forbush. Utah, 578 
P.2d 518 (1978), a distinction must be drawn between an express 
order of a District Court that a parent is under no obligation to 
provide support for a child of the marriage, as compared to the mere 
silence of a divorce decree as to whether any child support obliga-
tion is imposed on the non-custodial parent. 
The Divorce Decree in the instant case awarded the custody of 
the two dependent children to the defendant and ordered Mr. Hutchison 
to make payment of a monthly child support obligation in the amount 
of Sixty dollars ($60.00) per month per child. Based on the facts 
which existed at the time of the entry of the Decree, that Decree 
is understandably silent as to the amount of any child support 
obligation which would be owed by the defendant. However, events 
which have occurred subsequent to the entry of the Decree (i.e., 
Mr. Hutchison obtaining physical custody of both children, based 
upon an agreement between himself and the defendant, and subse-
quently receiving public assistance which was provided as support 
for those children), may properly give rise to a possible obligation 
of the defendant to reimburse the State of Utah for the public 
assistance which was provided for the support of her children. 
Without doubt, the defendant has both a common law and statutory 
obligation to support her children which, for the purposes of this 
proceeding, is neither reduced nor eliminated by whatever may be 
implied from the language of the parties' Divorce Decree. The defen-
dant is a 'responsible parent" within the meaning of §78-45b-2(9). 
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which defines that term as "the natural parent, adoptive parent, or 
stepparent of a dependent child." Further, as stated in §78-45b-l.l: 
"It is declared to be the public policy of this 
state that this chapter be liberally construed 
and administered to the end that children shall 
be maintained from the resources of responsible 
parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least 
in part, the burden often borne by the general 
citizenry through welfare programs." 
In essence, the existence of an obligation to provide child support 
in this matter and the amount of reimbursement owed by the defendant 
to the State of Utah may properly be determined in administrative 
proceedings initiated pursuant to §78-45b-l et seq. Further, any 
subsequent order requiring the defendant to provide such reimburse-
ment would not conflict with any specific language of the previously 
entered Divorce Decree. 
Administrative proceedings initiated pursuant to §78-45b-l et 
seq., are intended to assess whatever child support obligation may 
exist and to set forth that amount of reimbursement to be paid to 
the State of Utah, relative to public assistance which has been 
provided for the support of dependent children. Said proceedings 
are not intended to assess whether recipients of public assistance 
were entitled to receive such assistance. Notwithstanding the 
defendant's assertion that Mr. Hutchison is physically able to work, 
there was no sufficient evidence presented during the instant 
hearing which would justify a stay of execution on any judgment 
entered against the defendant pending an investigation into the 
eligibility of Mr. Hutchison to have received the public assistance 
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which was so provided for the support of the two children in ques-
tion. However, should a referral for such an investigation be made 
to the Assistance Payments Administration Office and a determination 
subsequently made that Mr. Hutchison was ineligible to have received 
public assistance during any and/or all of the period of time for 
which a child support obligation is hereby imposed upon the defen-
dant, the judgment herein will be modified accordingly. 
Regarding the amount properly owed by the defendant. §78-45b-6(2) 
provides: 
"The administrative hearing examiner, after full 
and fair hearing, conducted in accordance with 
the rules and regulations of the department shall 
make specific findings regarding the liability 
and responsibility, if any, of the alleged 
responsible parent and the amount of such 
liability computable on the basis of the amount 
of assistance paid or to be paid. In making 
these findings, the hearing officer shall include 
in his deliberations the necessities and require-
ments of the child, exclusive of any income of 
the custodian of said child, the amount -of the 
support debt claimed, the amount of assistance 
paid or to be paid, the abilities and resources 
of the responsible parent and the public policy 
and intent of the legislature to require that 
children be maintained from the resources of 
responsible parents thereby relieving to the 
greatest extent possible the burden upon the 
general citizenry through welfare programs." 
Although the defendant was not employed during the period of time 
under review and. thus, had no monthly income during the five months 
in question, the defendant should nevertheless be obligated to pro-
vide some reimbursement to the State of Utah for the public assis-
tance which has been provided for the support of that child who 
resided with Mr. Hutchison and for whom public assistance was 
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provided. Given her lack of employment and available monthly income, 
a reasonably nominal assessment which should be imposed upon the 
defendant in that regard is Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per month, 
or a total of One hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00). 
Inasmuch as it appears that public assistance will continue to 
be provided for the support of one of the two children in question, 
the defendant's on-going obligation to provide some reimbursement to 
the State of Utah in that regard should also be computed at the rate 
of Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per month. 
One further matter should be addressed. Section 78-45b-17 
provides: 
"The department may consistent with the income, 
earning capacity and resources of the debtor, set 
or reset a level and schedule of payments to be 
paid upon the debt...." 
Although the child support arrearage which is owed by the defendant 
represents an outstanding indebtedness which is due and owing in 
full, pursuant to the just-quoted statute, the defendant may be 
afforded the opportunity to commence repayment in satisfaction of 
that indebtedness over an extended period of time. Given the defen-
dant's current lack of employment and monthly income, she should not 
be presently required to commence repayment in satisfaction of the 
indebtedness which exists. Further, she should not be required to 
make payment in satisfaction of any on-going child support obligation 
which may exist, relative to public assistance which may be provided 
for the support of the one child who still lives with Mr. Hutchison. 
Rather, an investigator from the Office of Recovery Services should 
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periodically monitor the defendant's financial circumstances. As 
may be appropriate, the defendant should be required to attend an 
assessment conference with said investigator, whereby some determi-
nation be initially made as to whatever rate of repayment would be 
properly required of the defendant, relative to the eventual satis-
faction of whatever child support arrearage may subsequently exist. 
Dated this November, 1983. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed that judgment in the sum of One hundred twenty-five dollars 
($125.00) be entered against the defendant. Said judgment represents 
reimbursement properly owed to the State of Utah for public assis-
tance which was provided to John Collins Hutchison from June 1, 1983 
through October, 1983, relative to the support of either and/or both 
of the defendant's dependent children, to wit: Diana Michele and 
John Collins. Jr. 
It is further ordered that, so long as public assistance is 
provided for the support of that child (i.e., Diana Michele) who 
presently resides with Mr. Hutchison, the defendant's on-going child 
support obligation in that regard shall be at the rate of Twenty-
five dollars ($25.00) per month. 
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It is further ordered that, pursuant to §78-45b-17. an investi-
gator from the Office of Recovery Services shall periodically monitor 
the defendant's employment and financial circumstances- As may be 
subsequently warranted, the defendant shall be required to attend an 
assessment conference with said investigator, wherein a determination 
shall be initially made as to whatever rate of repayment shall be 
required of the defendant toward the satisfaction of the judgment 
set forth herein and any unpaid child support arrearages which may 
accrue in the interim. 
Judicial review of these Findings and Order may be obtained by 
filing a Petition and Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) with the District 
Court within twenty days after receipt of the Findings and Order 
herein. Said Petition shall be served upon the Department and shall 
state the grounds upon which review in this matter is sought* 
Dated this <?& day of November. 1983. 
NORMAN G. ANGUS 
Executive Director 
( 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I have mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum of Findings and Order to Paul D. Vernieu, 
Deputy Weber County Attorney, to Recovery Services Team #12, to John 
-11-
C Hutchison, to Marsha Lee Starks. and
 t 0 h e r a t t o r n e y . L e l a n d R 
iflmrc, on tnfs tbe <^MiAy of November. 1983. 
Si^%^ 
P21 7828804 
RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDED-
M27JWW&JM7WA1 m>l 
(See Reverse) 
3 0 ^ N o o t : Comic* tanf 
c* 
< 
jSENT TO I 
bs^arsiicL_Le_e Starks 
| STREET AND NO 
|27Rn Lihertv 
PO STATE AND ZIP CODE 1 
Oaderu Utah 84403 1 
:POSTAGE 
CO
NS
UL
T 
PO
ST
M
AS
TE
R 
FO
R 
FE
ES
 
CERTIFIED FEE 
OP
TI
ON
AL
 
SE
RV
IC
ES
 
SPECIAL DELIVERY 
RESTRICTED DELIVERY 
RE
TU
RN
 
RE
CE
IP
T 
SE
RV
IC
E SHOA TC WHDV AND 
DnTEDE JEERED 
SHOV, TO WHOK' DATt 
AND ADDRESS OF 
DELIVER* 
SnOV. 70 WHC V A C A T E 
DEUVE»ED.Vi^ RESECTED 
3EJvEpY 
SHO\*> Tc\^:v C-"EA\: 
AOD»ESS0eDEUV: = "V. "~ 
=£S'?rEDDEJVt = 
TOTAL POSTAGE AND FEES 
s 1 
3 
fosrMA#«7#aA re 
A4«i 
l > 2 . - * 3 . 
ki o* muxjvm to^i 
H 1 - ^followiagjeffif«liitqi»sted (check oat.) 
G^Show towbom md date defc*erefi..» 
D Show to wfaan/dtie tad tdditnof ttfaperj-.* 
t l £ESTRICTED DELIVERY 
Siowlo^ikctQ'isd date dclrmod*»••»•••»»• •. 
Q 1^STWCin)13EIJVERY. 
*Show to wbccn. dat*. and *ddra» ofiWlwwyX 
(CONSULTPOSTVASTEK FO&£EE$ 
Wf^kauSRTlle Si arks" 
*27%0'Liberty 
Dgden, Utah "84403 
•• ARTICLE DESCItarnOM: 
*&feSTERED Ma I CERTIFIED M a 
P21 7828804} 
WOk 
jjAh»ay» obftw signature of adttrnnm or >o6nt) 
1 ***?e received tbe article described above. 
•^WATURE OAddreaee QAadiocfczad t « t 
/ ' n A T T OP nf I I V P B V O' ^ T / v > r r u A D r 
/-•?<>-£•? a 
A0OAESS (Comptew owv If 
ID *• UNABLE TO DEUVEA BECAUSE; 
<&<*0 : \91*3B*3*B 
- 1 2 -
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 191986 
H. OixonHmdtoy,Ol^c8rtOtot Court 
By OtputyCI*t 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA LEE STARKS, aka 
MARSHA LEE BEACHLER, 
Petitioner/Defendant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Social Services, 
Respondent/Plaintiff. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-83-8696 
Before the Court is the petitioner's Petition for Review 
wherein she seeks to have this Court, pursuant to Section 78-45b-6.1 
of the Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, review the Findings 
and Order of the Department of Social Services for the State 
of Utah. While the matter has been on file for 6ome period 
of time and brought to a head by the Court fs Order to Show Cause 
directed to the parties
 # requiring them to appear and show cause 
why the matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecaite 
the briefs as required by the aforementioned Section have now 
been filed, and the matter is ready for decision* 
Upon reviewing the matters in the Courtfs official file, 
the Petition, the transcript of evidence taken before the Admini-
strative Law Judge, the Findings, Conclusions and Order entered 
by the Administrative Law Judge, as well as the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities submitted by both the petitioner and 
STARKS V. STATE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the respondent, the Court finds that the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and the Order as entered by the Department 
of Social Services through its Administrative Law Judge are 
supported by the facts, well-founded in the law, and should 
otherwise be affirmed. 
Therefore, the Court affirms the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and the Order entered by the Administrative Law Judge 
for the Department of Social Services, and denies the Petition 
of the petitioner Marsha Lee Starks wherein she seeks to be 
relieved of the obligations imposed on her by the Administrative 
Order. 
Counsel for the Department of Social Services is to prepare 
an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, 
and submit the same to the Court for signature and review in 
accordance with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this // day of June, 1986. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 4 copies of the foregoing Brief was 
served to Blaine Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, by mailing said 
Brief by first-class mail, postage prepaid, or by 
hand-delivering said copies this day of , 
1987. 
llb/beachler.bri 
